Since this is the first precedent in the 2-year history of Goldfinch, the GIP makes sense to maintain the attractiveness of the protocol’s yield-bearing instruments, even though there isn’t enough data to analyze the likelihood of recurrence.
In a situation where there’s no new precedent significantly impacting LPs (it’s worth noting that there aren’t many counterparties whose borrowings are 100% collateralized by the senior tranche’s liquidity), Goldfinch certainly remains in a favorable position. Therefore, I’ll be voting for Yes.
This is the first case of this kind, and we need to approach this issue responsibly.
Although the Proposal states that the Treasury should not be considered as a permanent guarantor in the event of similar situations occurring at any time in the future, this Proposal sets a precedent. And the treasury in the future will still be regarded by interested parties as a possible guarantor.
At a minimum, there are two possible ways to prevent the Treasury from becoming the default guarantor:
The most natural way is through voting in each specific situation;
Another way is to artificially maintain in the treasury an amount equal to ~150k USDC (if more accumulates, spend it on some other purpose or transfer it to some other reserve fund).
If we evaluate the current situation from the point of view of the market (market relations), then the Senior Pool participants were aware (or should have been aware) of the risks that they would have to face. These losses are nothing more than realized risks. And only the participants themselves are responsible for their own losses.
On the other hand, this situation can also be assessed from the standpoint of the Goldfinch community and from the standpoint of “reputational” losses. Senior pool positions are losing their attractiveness. From these positions, the use of the treasury is justified. This will preserve the attractiveness of the Senior Pool, and therefore the project as a whole.
The calculations carried out in the forecast seem to me to be quite correct (adjusted for the possible difference in the timing of debt restructuring and the timing of incoming payments).
I believe that if the Treasury is to be used in this situation, then the payment should be made as quickly as possible and in the maximum possible amounts (i.e., as described in the proposal, 850k + 45k + 45k + 45k + 15k).
I am more inclined to vote “YES” and wish that such situations, if possible, will not be repeated in the future.